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Abstract  
We show that the Roy model has more precise predictions about the self-
selection of migrants than previously realized. The same conditions that have 
been shown to result in positive or negative selection in terms of expected 
earnings also imply a stochastic dominance relationship between the earnings 
distributions of migrants and non-migrants. We use the Danish full population 
administrative data to test the predictions. We find strong evidence of positive 
self-selection of emigrants in terms of pre-emigration earnings: the income 
distribution for the migrants almost stochastically dominates the distribution for 
the non-migrants. This result is not driven by immigration policies in destination 
countries. Decomposing the self-selection in total earnings into self-selection in 
observable characteristics and self-selection in unobservable characteristics 
reveals that unobserved abilities play the dominant role. 
Key words: international migration, Roy model, self-selection 
 
JEL classes: F22, J61  
 
 
 1
1.	Introduction	
	
A	central	finding	in	the	economic	literature	on	international	migration	is	that	emigrants	are	
not	randomly	selected	from	the	population	of	the	source	countries.	The	nature	of	the	non‐
random	selection	affects	the	level	and	the	distribution	of	welfare	through	two	major	
channels.	First,	the	skill	distribution	of	migrants	affects	the	wage	structure	in	both	sending	
and	receiving	countries	(Borjas	2003).	A	second	effect	takes	place	through	the	public	sector.	
Immigration	creates	a	fiscal	surplus	in	the	receiving	country	if	and	only	if	the	net	present	
value	of	the	tax	payments	of	immigrants	exceeds	the	net	present	value	of	the	costs	they	
impose.	Both	the	immigration	of	net	recipients	and	the	emigration	of	net	payers	pose	a	
challenge	to	the	public	treasury	(Wildasin	1991;	Sinn	1997).		
	
Beginning	with	Borjas	(1987),	there	has	been	a	great	deal	of	interest	in	deriving	and	
empirically	testing	models	that	predict	how	migrants	differ	from	non‐migrants.	Many	of	
these	studies	rely	on	an	application	of	the	Roy	model	of	occupational	self‐selection.	As	long	
as	skills	are	sufficiently	transferable	across	countries,	the	sorting	of	persons	across	
countries	is	mainly	determined	by	international	differences	in	the	rate	of	return	to	skills.	A	
country	like	the	United	States	would	then	attract	high‐skilled	workers	from	more	
egalitarian	countries	(i.e.,	countries	offering	relatively	low	rates	of	return	to	skills)	and	low‐
skilled	workers	from	countries	with	greater	income	inequality	(i.e.,	countries	offering	
higher	rates	of	return	to	skills).	The	evidence	indeed	suggests	a	negative	cross‐section	
correlation	between	the	earnings	of	immigrants	in	the	United	States	and	income	inequality	
in	the	source	countries.1	
	
Although	the	existing	literature	on	immigrant	selection	focuses	mainly	on	the	U.S.	context	
or	on	migration	flows	from	poor	to	rich	countries,	there	are	also	sizable	migration	flows	
between	rich	countries.	According	to	the	United	Nations	(2013),	21.9	million	persons	from	
																																																								
1	Related	cross‐country	studies	include	Cobb‐Clark	(1993)	and	Bratsberg	(1995).	Grogger	and	Hanson	(2011)	
examine	the	selection	of	migrants	across	a	broad	range	of	countries	using	an	alternative	theoretical		
framework	where	individuals	maximize	linear	utility	and	migration	is	driven	by	absolute	earnings	differences	
between	high	and	low‐skilled	workers.	
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EU15	countries	now	live	outside	their	birthplace,	with	42	percent	of	these	migrants	living	
in	other	EU15	countries	and	an	additional	13	percent	living	in	the	United	States.2		
	
This	paper	examines	the	self‐selection	of	emigrants	from	Denmark,	one	of	the	richest	and	
most	redistributive	European	welfare	states.	In	2013,	over	a	quarter	million	Danes	lived	
outside	Denmark	(corresponding	to	about	5	percent	of	the	Danish‐born	population),	with	
50	percent	of	the	migrants	living	in	other	EU15	countries	and	13	percent	in	the	United	
States	(United	Nations,	Department	of	Economic	and	Social	Affairs	2013).	Because	the	
returns	to	skills	in	Denmark	are	relatively	low,	the	canonical	Roy	model	predicts	that	the	
emigrants	should	be	positively	selected	in	the	sense	that	the	expected	earnings	of	the	
migrants	exceed	the	expected	earnings	of	the	stayers.3	However,	there	have	been	few	
systematic	studies	of	the	self‐selection	of	migrants	from	a	relatively	egalitarian	country	to	
see	whether	this	is	indeed	the	case.4	
	
Our	theoretical	analysis	shows	that	the	canonical	framework	does	not	only	have	
predictions	about	the	difference	between	the	expected	earnings	of	migrants	and	non‐
migrants,	which	is	the	basis	for	the	standard	definition	of	positive	or	negative	selection	in	
the	literature,	but	also	about	the	stochastic	ordering	of	the	two	earnings	distributions.	We	
show	that	the	same	conditions	that	predict	that	migrants	are	positively	self‐selected	in	the	
sense	of	a	difference	in	expected	incomes	also	predict	that	the	income	distribution	of	the	
migrants	will	first‐order	stochastically	dominate	the	income	distribution	of	the	non‐
migrants.	The	theory	also	distinguishes	between	selection	in	observable	and	selection	in	
unobservable	characteristics.	
																																																								
2	The	EU15	countries	refer	to	the	member	states	of	the	European	Union	prior	to	the	expansion	on	May	1,	
2004.	
3	For	comparisons	of	gross	wage	premia	from	tertiary	education	across	countries	see	Boarini	and	Straus	
(2010).	A	recent	paper	studying	returns	to	cognitive	skills	is	Hanushek	et	al.	(2015).	The	study	finds	
significant	cross‐country	differences.	Moreover,	the	returns	are	relatively	low	in	Denmark	as	well	as	in	other	
Nordic	countries,	and	high	in	the	United	States,	Germany	and	the	United	Kingdom,	which	also	are	among	the	
most	popular	destinations	of	Danish	migrants.			
	
4	Studies	of	the	selection	of	migrants	across	developed	countries	include	Lundborg	(1991),	Pirttilä	(2004),	
Kleven	et	al.	(2014),	and	Junge	et	al.	(2014).	Many	studies	also	examine	selection	issues	in	a	historical	
context;	see	Wegge	(1999,	2002),	Abramitzky	and	Braggion	(2006),	Abramitzky,	Boustan,	and	Eriksson	
(2012),	Ferrie	(1996),	and	Margo	(1990).		
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Our	empirical	analysis	uses	the	Danish	full	population	administrative	data	to	analyze	how	
migrants	and	non‐migrants	differ	in	their	pre‐emigration	earnings	and	other	observable	
characteristics.	To	shed	light	on	the	role	of	unobservable	characteristics	in	the	selection	
process,	we	investigate	how	migrants	and	non‐migrants	differ	in	terms	of	unobservable	
earnings	ability,	as	measured	by	residuals	from	Mincerian	earnings	regressions.	Our	
empirical	results	are	in	line	with	the	predictions	of	the	model:	Danish	emigrants	are	indeed		
positively	self‐selected	both	in	terms	of	earnings	and	in	terms	of	residuals	from	the	wage	
regressions.	Following	our	reframing	of	the	canonical	Roy	framework	in	terms	of	the	
concept	of	stochastic	dominance,	our	study	specifically	tests	for	whether	the	earnings	
distribution	of	the	emigrants	stochastically	dominates	that	of	the	stayers	(as	would	be	
predicted	by	the	model).	The	evidence	confirms	this	strong	theoretical	prediction	over	
most	of	the	support	of	the	earnings	distribution.		
	
Our	study	is	related	to	the	flurry	of	recent	papers	that	examine	the	selection	of	migrants	
from	Mexico	to	the	United	States.	The	pioneering	analysis	of	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005)	
merged	information	from	the	U.S.	census	on	the	characteristics	of	the	Mexican	migrants	
with	information	from	the	Mexican	census	on	the	characteristics	of	the	Mexican	non‐
migrants.	Because	the	merged	data	did	not	report	the	earnings	of	migrants	prior	to	the	
move,	pre‐migration	earnings	were	predicted	based	on	observable	characteristics	of	the	
migrants.	This	“counterfactual”	empirical	exercise	suggested	that	Mexican	emigrants	were	
located	in	the	medium‐high	range	of	the	Mexican	wage	distribution.	The	finding	of	
intermediate	selection	in	the	Mexican	context	does	not	seem	consistent	with	the	basic	
implications	of	the	Roy	model	because	the	rate	of	return	to	skills	is	far	larger	in	Mexico	
than	in	the	United	States.	More	recent	studies	by	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	(2011)	and	
Kaestner	and	Malamud	(2014)	use	survey	data	that	report	the	actual	pre‐migration	
earnings	and	find	evidence	of	negative	selection.	They	also	conclude	that	part	of	the	
negative	selection	can	be	traced	to	the	unobservable	characteristics	that	determine	a	
migrant’s	earnings.		
	
The	important	role	played	by	unobservable	characteristics	implies	that	constructing	a	
counterfactual	earnings	distribution	for	the	migrants	based	on	observable	characteristics	
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can	greatly	bias	the	nature	of	the	selection	revealed	by	the	data.	Our	findings	suggest	that	
the	use	of	such	a	counterfactual	distribution	will	tend	to	understate	the	true	selection	in	
earnings,	so	that	the	selection	implied	by	the	counterfactual	distribution	is	far	weaker	than	
the	true	selection—regardless	of	whether	there	is	positive	or	negative	selection.	The	
numerical	bias	that	results	from	using	the	counterfactual	estimation	is	sizable	in	the	Danish	
context:	more	than	half	of	the	difference	between	the	expected	earnings	of	migrants	and	
non‐migrants	arises	because	of	differences	in	unobserved	characteristics.	
	
The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	sketches	the	economic	theory	underlying	the	
analysis	and	derives	theoretical	predictions	concerning	the	self‐selection	of	emigrants,	
using	the	notion	of	stochastic	dominance	as	a	unifying	concept.	Section	3	introduces	and	
describes	the	unique	population	data	that	we	use	and	reports	some	summary	statistics.	
Sections	4	and	5	present	the	main	empirical	findings.	In	section	4,	we	examine	the	selection	
in	terms	of	observed	pre‐migration	earnings.	We	present	a	statistical	method	for	testing	
the	theoretical	implication	that	the	earnings	distribution	of	the	emigrants	should	
stochastically	dominate	the	corresponding	distribution	of	the	non‐migrants.	Section	5	
extends	the	empirical	work	by	examining	the	selection	that	occurs	in	the	unobserved	
component	of	earnings.	Section	6	evaluates	the	bias	that	results	from	predicting	the	pre‐
migration	earnings	of	emigrants	from	the	earnings	distribution	of	non‐migrants.	Section	7	
examines	whether	the	selection	of	persons	moving	to	other	EU15	countries	differs	from	the	
selection	of	migrants	moving	to	countries	where	immigration	restrictions	come	into	play.	
We	find	that	immigration	restrictions	have	little	effect	on	the	selection	of	emigrants.	Finally,	
Section	8	summarizes	the	study	and	draws	some	lessons	for	future	research.	
	
2.	Theoretical	framework	
	
Previous	literature	on	the	self‐selection	of	migrants	has	focused	on	the	conditional	
expectations	of	earnings	distributions	among	migrants	and	stayers.	In	this	section,	we	
derive	a	novel	result:	the	Roy	model	implies	that	under	certain	conditions,	the	earnings	
distribution	of	migrants	first‐order	stochastically	dominates,	or	is	stochastically	dominated	
by,	the	earnings	distribution	of	stayers.	In	a	bivariate	normal	framework,	it	turns	out	that	
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the	conditions	required	for	stochastic	dominance	are	identical	to	the	conditions	that	
determine	the	nature	of	self‐selection	in	terms	of	expected	earnings.	
	
We	also	decompose	self‐selection	into	two	components,	one	that	is	determined	by	
differences	in	returns	to	observable	skills	between	source	and	host	country,	and	one	that	is	
determined	by	differences	in	returns	to	unobservable	skills.	The	distinction	between	
observable	and	unobservable	skills,	of	course,	depends	on	the	empirical	framework	and	on	
the	data	that	is	being	used;	observable	skills	include	the	variables	explaining	earnings	that	
are	included	in	the	data,	while	the	component	of	earnings	that	is	left	unexplained	by	the	
data	is	the	unobservable	skill	component.	Even	though	the	content	of	the	two	components	
differs	among	data	sets,	it	is	likely	that	a	major	part	of	migrant	self‐selection	is	determined	
by	the	unobservable	component	simply	because	“observables”	tend	to	explain	a	relatively	
small	fraction	of	the	variance	in	earnings.		
	
We	take	as	our	starting	point	the	migration	decision	faced	by	potential	migrants	in	a	two‐
country	framework,	in	line	with	Borjas	(1987)	and	subsequent	literature.	Residents	of	the	
source	country	(country	0)	consider	migrating	to	the	destination	country	(country	1),	and	
the	migration	decision	is	assumed	to	be	irreversible.	To	simplify	the	presentation,	we	focus	
on	a	single	observed	skill	characteristic	s	and	suppress	the	subscript	that	indexes	a	
particular	individual.	For	concreteness,	the	variable	s	can	be	thought	of	as	giving	the	
worker’s	years	of	educational	attainment,	but	it	includes	all	the	characteristics	affecting	
individual’s	income	that	are	observed	in	a	given	set	of	data.	Residents	of	the	source	country	
face	the	earnings	distribution:	
	
(1)	 	 logݓ଴ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅ ݎ଴ݏ ൅ ߝ଴ᇱ	 	
 
where	w0	gives	the	wage	in	the	source	country;	r0	gives	the	rate	of	return	to	observable	
skills;	and	the	random	variable	0	measures	individual‐specific	productivity	shocks	
resulting	from	unobserved	characteristics	and	is	normally	distributed	with	mean	zero	and	
variance	 .	The	distribution	of	observable	skills	in	the	source	country’s	population	is	 02
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given	by	s	=	s	+	s,	where	the	random	variable	s	is	also	assumed	to	be	normally	
distributed	with	mean	zero	and	variance	 .	
	 	
If	the	entire	population	of	the	source	country	were	to	migrate,	this	population	would	face	
the	earnings	distribution:	
	
(2)	 	 log	ݓଵ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ݎଵݏ ൅ ߝଵᇱ		
 
where	the	random	variable	1	is	normally	distributed	with	mean	zero	and	variance	12 .	
	
For	analytical	convenience,	we	assume	that	Cov(0,	s)	=	Cov(1,	s)	=	0,	so	that	the	
individual‐specific	unobserved	productivity	shocks	(i.e.,	the	“residuals”	from	the	regression	
line)	are	independent	from	observable	characteristics.5	The	correlation	coefficient	between	
0	and	1	equals	01.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	random	variable	s	is	individual‐specific	
and	has	the	same	value	for	the	same	individual	in	both	countries,	whereas	0	and	1	are	
both	individual‐	and	country‐specific.	
	 	
Equations	(1)	and	(2)	completely	describe	the	earnings	opportunities	available	to	persons	
born	in	the	source	country.	Assume	that	the	migration	decision	is	determined	by	a	
comparison	of	earnings	opportunities	across	countries	net	of	migration	costs	C.	Define	the	
index	function:	
	
(3)	 	 ܫ ൌ log ቀ ௪భ௪బା஼ቁ ൎ ሾሺߙଵ െ ߙ଴ሻ ൅ ሺݎଵ െ ݎ଴ሻߤ௦ െ ߨሿ ൅ ሾሺݎଵߝ௦ ൅ ߝଵሻ െ ሺݎ଴ߝ௦ ൅ ߝ଴ሻሿ	
																														ൌ ∆ߤ ൅ ሺݒଵ െ ݒ଴ሻ,	
	 	
																																																								
5	A	more	realistic	assumption	would	be	that	the	correlation	between	observed	and	unobserved	skills	is	
positive.	However,	allowing	for	positive	correlation	does	not	change	the	qualitative	predictions	of	the	model.	
 s2
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where		gives	a	“time‐equivalent”	measure	of	migration	costs	(	=	C/w0).	The	cross‐country	
difference	in	earnings	net	of	the	time‐equivalent	migration	cost	for	an	individual	with	
average	observed	and	unobserved	characteristics	is	given	by		
	=	[(1	–	0)	+	(r1	–	r0)	s	–	].	The	difference	in	earnings	attributable	to	individual	
deviation	from	average	characteristics	is	given	by	ሺݒଵ െ ݒ଴ሻ,	where	vi	=	(ri	s	+	i)	for	
݅ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ.	A	person	emigrates	if	the	index	I	>	0,	and	remains	in	the	origin	country	otherwise.	
	 	
Migration	costs	vary	among	persons—but	the	sign	of	the	correlation	between	costs	
(whether	in	dollars	or	in	time‐equivalent	terms)	and	skills	(both	observed	and	
unobserved)	is	ambiguous	and	difficult	to	determine.	The	heterogeneity	in	migration	costs	
can	be	incorporated	to	the	model	by	assuming	that	the	distribution	of	the	random	variable	
	in	the	source	country’s	population	is	given	by		=		+		,	where		is	the	mean	level	of	
migration	costs	in	the	population,	and		is	a	normally	distributed	random	variable	with	
mean	zero	and	variance	 .	However,	Borjas	(1987)	and	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005)	show	
that	time‐equivalent	migration	costs	do	not	play	a	role	in	the	algorithm	that	determines	the	
selection	of	emigrants	if	either	those	costs	are	constant	(so	that	2 	=	0),	or	if	the	costs	are	
uncorrelated	with	skills.	For	analytical	convenience,	we	assume	that	time‐equivalent	
migration	costs	are	constant,	so	that		=	.6	The	outmigration	rate	from	the	source	country	
is	then	given	by:	
	
(4)	 	 ܲݎሺܫ ൐ 0ሻ ൌ ܲݎሾݒ∗ ൐ െ∆ߤ∗ሿ ൌ 1 െ ߔሺെ∆ߤ∗ሻ,	
 
where	v*	=	(v1		v0)/v	is	a	standard	normal	random	variable;	*	=	/v;	v2 	=	Var(v1	–	
v0);	and		is	the	standard	normal	distribution	function.7		
																																																								
6	If	ߨ	were	negatively	correlated	with	skills,	the	negative	correlation	would	tend	to	induce	the	more	skilled	to	
migrate,	creating	a	positively	selected	migrant	flow.	This	would	strengthen	positive	self‐selection,	and	
weaken	negative	self‐selection.		
7	It	is	straightforward	to	study	equation	(4)	to	confirm	that	the	migration	rate	rises,	when	mean	income	in	the	
source	country	falls,	mean	income	in	the	host	country	rises,	returns	to	observed	skills	in	the	source	country	
fall,	returns	to	observed	skills	in	the	host	country	rise,	time‐equivalent	migration	costs	fall	and	when	mean	
observed	skills	rise	if	r1	>	r0	or	fall	if	r1	<	r0.	
2
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In	addition	to	identifying	the	determinants	of	the	outmigration	rate	in	equation	(4),	the	Roy	
model	lets	us	examine	which	persons	find	it	most	worthwhile	to	leave	the	source	country.8	
In	the	following,	we	examine	the	self‐selection	of	emigrants	along	two	dimensions:	
selection	in	terms	of	observable	skills	s	and	selection	in	terms	of	unobservable	skills	0,	
which	together	combine	into	selection	in	terms	of	total	productivity	or	earnings,	as	
measured	by	log	w0.		
	
Let	FM(z)	and	FN(z)	represent	the	(cumulative)	probability	distributions	of	skills	or	
earnings	for	migrants	and	non‐migrants	in	the	source	country,	respectively,	where	z	
denotes	a	particular	measure	of	skills	(e.g.,	observable	or	unobservable	characteristics	or	
income).	By	definition,	the	probability	distribution	of	migrants	FM(z)	first‐order	
stochastically	dominates	that	of	stayers	FN(z)	if:	
	
(5)	 	 ࡲࡹሺݖሻ ൑ ࡲࡺሺݖሻ∀	ݖ,	
	
and	there	is	at	least	one	value	of	ݖ	for	which	a	strict	inequality	holds.9	From	now	on,	
whenever	we	refer	to	stochastic	dominance,	we	mean	first‐order	stochastic	dominance.		
	
Equation	(5)	implies	that	a	larger	fraction	of	the	migrants	have	skills	above	any	threshold	
z*.	Put	differently,	for	any	level	of	skills	z*,	the	population	described	by	the	probability	
distribution	FM	is	more	skilled	because	a	larger	fraction	of	the	group	exceeds	that	threshold.	
The	migrants,	in	short,	are	positively	selected.	Negative	selection,	of	course,	would	occur	if	
the	reverse	was	true	and	۴ۼሺݖሻ ൑ 	۴ۻሺݖሻ		z,	with	a	strict	inequality	holding	for	at	least	one	
value	of	ݖ.	
																																																								
8	Throughout	the	analysis,	we	assume	that	*	is	constant.	The	migration	flow	is	effectively	assumed	to	be	
sufficiently	small	that	there	are	no	feedback	effects	on	the	labor	markets	of	either	the	source	or	destination	
countries.	
9	An	alternative	and	perhaps	more	intuitive	definition	of	stochastic	dominance	is	in	terms	of	
quantiles.	Let	ܳெሺܲሻ	and	ܳேሺܲሻ	be	the	quantile	functions	of	order	ܲ	of	the	skill	distributions	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	FM(z)	stochastically	dominates	FN(z)	if	and	only	if	ܳெሺܲሻ ൒ ܳேሺܲሻ	for	all	0 ൑ ܲ ൑ 1	and	there	
is	at	least	one	value	of	ܲ	for	which	a	strict	inequality	holds.	
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If	the	skill	distribution	of	migrants	stochastically	dominates	that	of	non‐migrants,	the	
stochastic	dominance	then	also	implies	the	typical	definition	of	positive	selection	that	is	
based	on	conditional	expectations:	
	
(6)	 	 ܧሺݖ|ܫ ൐ 0ሻ ൐ ܧሺݖ|ܫ ൑ 0ሻ,	
	
so	that	migrants,	on	average,	are	more	skilled	than	stayers.	Conversely,	if	the	probability	
distribution	of	stayers	stochastically	dominates	that	of	migrants,	and	there	was	negative	
selection,	it	would	also	follow	that	ܧሺݖ|ܫ ൐ 0ሻ ൏ ܧሺݖ|ܫ ൑ 0ሻ.	The	converse,	however,	is	not	
true	for	a	general	distribution:	A	claim	of	positive	selection	in	expectations,	as	defined	by	
equation	(6),	does	not	imply	that	the	skill	distribution	of	migrants	stochastically	dominates	
that	of	non‐migrants.		
	
To	derive	the	stochastic	ordering	of	the	skill	distributions	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants,	let	
f(x,	v)	be	a	bivariate	normal	density	function,	with	means	(x,	v),	variances	 ( x2 ,v2 ) 	and	
correlation	coefficient	.	Further,	let	the	random	variable	v	be	truncated	from	below	at	
point	a	and	from	above	at	point	b.	Arnold	et	al.	(1993,	p.	473)	show	that	the	(marginal)	
moment	generating	function	of	the	standardized	random	variable	(x	‐	x)/x,	given	the	
truncation	of	v,	is	given	by:	
	
(7)	 	 ݉ሺݐሻ ൌ ቂ஍ሺఉିఘ௧ሻି஍ሺఈିఘ௧ሻ஍ሺఉሻି஍ሺఈሻ ቃ ݁௧
మ/ଶ,	
		
where		=	(a	–	v)/v;	and		=	(b	–	v)v.	
	 	
In	terms	of	the	migration	decision,	the	truncation	in	the	random	variable	v	=	v1	–	v0	in	the	
sample	of	migrants	is	from	below	and	implies	that		=	–*=	k,	and		=	,	where	k	is	the	
truncation	point.	In	the	sample	of	stayers,	the	truncation	in	v	is	from	above,	and	the	
truncation	points	are		=	–	and		=	k.	By	substituting	these	definitions	into	equation	(7),	it	
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can	be	shown	that	the	moment	generating	functions	for	the	random	variable	giving	the	
conditional	distributions	of	skill	characteristic	x	for	migrants	and	stayers	reduce	to:	
	
(8)	 	
݉ிሺݐሻ ൌ ቈ1 െ Φ
ሺ݇ െ ߩݐሻ
1 െ Φሺ݇ሻ ቉ ݁
௧మ ଶൗ 	
	
and	
	
(9)	 	
݉ீሺݐሻ ൌ ቈΦሺ݇ െ ߩݐሻΦሺ݇ሻ ቉ ݁
௧మ ଶൗ .	
	
	
Consider	any	two	distribution	functions	F(z)	and	G(z).	Thistle	(1993,	p.	307)	shows	that	F	
will	stochastically	dominate	G	if	and	only	if:		
	
(10)	 	 ݉ிሺെݐሻ ൏ 	݉ீሺെݐሻ, ∀	ݐ ൐ 0,	
	
where	mF		is	the	moment	generating	function	associated	with	distribution	F;	mG		is	the	
moment	generating	function	associated	with	G.	
	
The	ranking	of	the	moment	generating	functions	in	equation	(10)	implies	we	can	determine	
the	stochastic	ranking	of	the	two	distributions	by	simply	solving	for	the	relevant	
correlation	coefficient	,	and	comparing	equations	(8)	and	(9).	Such	a	comparison	implies	
that:	
	
(11)	 	 ࡲࡹ	ሺݖሻ ൏ ࡲࡺሺݖሻ,							݂݅								ߩ ൐ 0	
	 	 ࡲࡹ	ሺݖሻ ൐ ࡲࡺሺݖሻ,							݂݅								ߩ ൏ 0.	
	
 11
In	other	words,	migrants	are	positively	selected	if		>	0,	and	are	negatively	selected	
otherwise.	Consider	initially	the	stochastic	ranking	in	observable	characteristics.	The	
random	variable	x	=	s,	and	the	relevant	correlation	coefficient		is	defined	by:	
	
(12)	 	 ߩ ൌ ܥ݋ݎݎሺߝ௦, ݒଵ െ ݒ଴ሻ ൌ ௥బఙೞఙೡ ቀ
௥భ
௥బ െ 1ቁ.	
	
Equation	(12)	shows	that	the	stochastic	ordering	of	the	distributions	of	observable	skills	of	
migrants	and	non‐migrants	depends	only	on	international	differences	in	the	rate	of	return	
to	observable	skills.	The	skill	distribution	of	migrants	will	stochastically	dominate	that	of	
stayers	when	the	rate	of	return	to	skills	is	higher	abroad.	Conversely,	the	skill	distribution	
for	non‐migrants	will	stochastically	dominate	the	distribution	for	migrants	if	the	rate	of	
return	to	observable	skills	is	larger	at	home.	
	
Consider	next	the	stochastic	ordering	in	the	conditional	distributions	of	unobservable	skills	
0.	The	relevant	correlation	for	determining	this	type	of	selection	is	given	by:	
	
(13)	 	 ߩ ൌ ܥ݋ݎݎ	ሺߝ଴, ݒଵ െ ݒ଴ሻ ൌ ఙబఙೡ ቀߩ଴ଵ
ఙభ
ఙబ െ 1ቁ.	
	
It	follows	that	the	distribution	of	unobservable	skills	for	migrants	stochastically	dominates	
that	for	non‐migrants	when	ߩ଴ଵ ఙభఙబ ൐ 1.	Note	that	the	necessary	condition	for	positive	
selection	has	two	components.	First,	the	unobserved	characteristics	must	be	“transferable”	
across	countries,	so	that	01	is	sufficiently	high.	Second,	the	residual	variance	in	earnings	is	
larger	in	the	destination	country	than	in	the	source	country.	The	residual	variances	02 	and	
12 ,	of	course,	measure	the	“price”	of	unobserved	characteristics:	the	greater	the	rewards	
to	unobserved	skills,	the	larger	the	residual	inequality	in	wages.10	As	long	as	unobserved	
																																																								
10	This	interpretation	of	the	variances	follows	from	the	definition	of	the	log	wage	distribution	in	the	host	
country	in	terms	of	what	the	population	of	the	source	country	would	earn	if	the	entire	population	migrated	
there.	This	definition	effectively	holds	constant	the	distribution	of	skills.	
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characteristics	are	sufficiently	transferable	across	countries,	emigrants	are	positively	
selected	when	the	rate	of	return	to	unobservable	skills	is	higher	in	the	destination.		
	
Finally,	consider	the	stochastic	ranking	in	“total”	productivity.	The	earnings	distribution	in	
the	source	country	given	by	equation	(1)	can	be	rewritten	as:	
	
(14)	 	 log	ݓ0	 ൌ 	 ሺα0	 ൅ 	ݎ0	μsሻ 	൅	ሺݎ0	εݏ	 ൅ 	ε0ሻ 	ൌ 	 ሺα0	 ൅ 	ݎ0	μݏሻ 	൅ 	ݒ0,	
	
where	the	normally	distributed	random	variable	v0	has	mean	zero	and	variance	v02 .	The	
relevant	correlation	for	determining	the	stochastic	ranking	of	the	earnings	distributions	of	
migrants	and	non‐migrants	is:	
	
(15)	 	 ߩ ൌ ܥ݋ݎݎሺݒ଴, ݒଵ െ ݒ଴ሻ ൌ ଵఙೡ ቂߛ ቀ
௥భ
௥బ െ 1ቁ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ቀߩ଴ଵ
ఙభ
ఙబ െ 1ቁቃ,	
	
where	ߛ ൌ ݎ଴ଶߪ௦ଶ ߪ௩଴ଶ⁄ 	and	1 െ ߛ ൌ ߪ଴ଶ ߪ௩଴ଶ⁄ .	
	
The	sign	of	the	correlation	in	equation	(15),	which	determines	the	nature	of	the	selection	in	
pre‐migration	earnings,	depends	on	the	sign	of	a	weighted	average	of	the	selection	that	
occurs	in	observable	and	unobservable	characteristics.	Interestingly,	the	weight	is	the	
fraction	of	the	variance	in	earnings	that	can	be	attributed	to	differences	in	observable	and	
unobservable	characteristics,	respectively.	
	
If	there	is	positive	(negative)	selection	in	both	“primitive”	types	of	skills,	there	will	then	be	
positive	(negative)	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings.	If,	however,	there	are	different	
types	of	selection	in	the	two	types	of	skills,	the	selection	in	each	type	is	weighted	by	its	
importance	in	creating	the	variance	of	the	earnings	distribution.	It	is	well	known	that	
observable	characteristics	(such	as	educational	attainment)	explain	a	relatively	small	
fraction	of	the	variance	in	earnings	(perhaps	less	than	a	third).	As	a	result,	equation	(15)	
implies	that	it	is	the	selection	in	unobservables	that	is	most	likely	to	determine	the	nature	of	
the	selection	in	the	pre‐migration	earnings	of	emigrants.	This	implication	plays	an	
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important	role	in	explaining	why	the	evidence	reported	in	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	
(2011)	and	Kaestner	and	Malamud	(2014)	conflicts	with	that	of	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	
(2005).	
	
As	mentioned	earlier,	the	stochastic	dominance	results	necessarily	imply	selection	in	terms	
of	conditional	expectations.	In	the	case	of	bivariate	normal	distributions,	it	follows	that	the	
expectation	of	the	earnings	distribution	of	migrants	E(log	w0	|	v*	>	*)	is	given	by:	
	
(16)	 ܧሺ݈݋݃ݓ଴|ݒ∗ ൐ െΔߤ∗ሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ݎ଴ߤ௦ ൅ ௥బఙೞ
మ
ఙೡ ቀ
௥భ
௥బ െ 1ቁ ߣሺെΔߤ
∗ሻ ൅ ఙబమఙೡ ቀߩ଴ଵ
ఙభ
ఙబ െ 1ቁ ߣሺെΔߤ
∗ሻ,	
	
where	*)	=	(*)/[1		(*)]	>	0,	and		is	the	density	of	the	standard	normal	
distribution.	As	can	be	seen	by	examining	equation	(16),	the	conditions	that	determine	the	
self‐selection	in	terms	of	expectations	are	the	same	as	the	conditions	that	determine	the	
stochastic	ordering	of	the	skill	distributions	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	In	the	normal	
distribution	framework	that	underlies	the	canonical	Roy	model,	stochastic	dominance	
implies	selection	in	expectations,	and	vice	versa.	
	
In	empirical	applications,	however,	the	prediction	of	stochastic	dominance	is	likely	to	be	
much	less	robust	than	the	predictions	concerning	expectations	because	testing	for	
stochastic	dominance	will	require	a	more	rigorous	test	than	simply	comparing	the	average	
incomes	or	skills	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	If	one	just	compares	the	averages	to	find	
out	how	migrants	are	self‐selected,	the	findings	can	be	compatible	with	the	predictions	of	
the	Roy‐model	even	if	a	large	number	of	individuals	in	the	data	behave	against	the	
stochastic	dominance	predictions	of	the	model.	As	a	result,	establishing	an	empirical	
pattern	of	stochastic	dominance	provides	very	strong	evidence	that	differences	in	skill	
prices	are	indeed	important	in	migration	decisions.		
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3.	Data	
	
Our	analysis	uses	administrative	data	for	the	entire	Danish	population	from	1995	to	2010.	
The	data	is	maintained	and	provided	by	Statistics	Denmark	and	it	derives	from	the	
administrative	registers	of	governmental	agencies	that	are	merged	using	a	unique	social	
security	number.11		
	
For	each	year	between	1995	and	2004,	we	identified	all	Danish	citizens	aged	25‐54	who	
lived	in	Denmark	during	the	entire	calendar	year.12	We	restrict	the	analysis	to	persons	who	
worked	full	time.13	Migration	decisions	of	part‐time	workers	or	of	workers	outside	the	
labor	force	may	be	driven	by	different	factors,	and	the	observed	income	of	these	workers	
may	not	be	indicative	of	their	true	earnings	potential.	The	income	variable	for	each	year	is	
constructed	by	adding	the	worker’s	annual	gross	labor	income	and	positive	values	of	
freelance	income.14		
	
We	merged	this	information	with	data	from	the	migration	register	for	the	years	1995	
through	2010.	The	migration	register	reports	the	date	of	emigration	and	the	country	of	
destination.	Even	though	it	is	possible	for	Danish	citizens	to	emigrate	without	registering,	
we	expect	that	the	numbers	of	persons	who	do	so	is	small	as	it	is	a	legal	requirement	for	
																																																								
11	All	residents	in	Denmark	are	legally	required	to	have	a	social	security	number.	This	number	is	necessary	to	
many	activities	in	daily	life,	including	opening	a	bank	account,	receiving	wages	and	salaries	or	social	
assistance,	obtaining	health	care,	and	enrolling	in	school.	
12	A	person’s	age	is	measured	as	of	January	1st	the	year	after	the	reference	year.	
13	The	administrative	data	allows	the	calculation	of	a	variable	that	measures	the	amount	of	“work	experience	
gained”	during	the	calendar	year.	The	maximum	possible	value	for	this	variable	is	1,000.	We	restrict	our	
sample	to	workers	who	have	a	value	of	900	or	above,	so	that	our	sample	roughly	consists	of	persons	who	
worked	full	time	at	least	90	percent	of	the	year.	In	order	to	measure	the	work	experience	gained	during	a	
given	year,	we	subtract	the	value	from	the	previous	year	from	the	current	value	of	the	variable.	Persons	who	
had	a	missing	value	for	work	experience	in	either	of	the	two	years	were	dropped	from	the	sample.	Missing	
values	in	this	variable	typically	indicate	that	the	person	spent	time	abroad.	
14	The	information	on	earnings	is	taken	from	the	tax	records	for	each	calendar	year.	This	variable	is	
considered	to	be	of	high	quality	by	Statistics	Denmark.	Some	persons	also	report	negative	values	for	freelance	
income.	These	negative	values	are	likely	to	be	due	to	losses	arising	from	investments	and	do	not	reflect	the	
productive	characteristics	of	the	individual.	
 15
Danish	citizens	to	report	emigration.	Danish	tax	laws	provide	further	incentives	for	
migrants	to	register	when	they	emigrate.	
	
After	identifying	the	population	of	interest,	we	determined	for	each	person	whether	he	or	
she	emigrated	from	Denmark	during	the	following	calendar	year.	If	we	found	that	a	
particular	person	emigrated,	we	searched	for	the	person	in	the	migration	register	for	
subsequent	years	to	determine	if	the	migrant	returned	to	Denmark	at	some	point	in	the	
future,	and	recorded	the	date	of	possible	return	migration.	The	migration	register	includes	
near‐complete	information	on	return	migration,	as	registration	in	Denmark	is	required	for	
the	return	migrant	to	be	eligible	for	income	transfers	and	to	be	covered	by	national	health	
insurance.	
	
To	focus	on	migration	decisions	that	are	permanent	in	nature,	we	restrict	the	analysis	to	
migration	spells	that	are	at	least	five	years	long.15	We	define	a	migrant	as	an	individual	who	
is	found	in	one	of	the	1995‐2004	cross‐sections,	who	emigrates	from	Denmark	during	the	
following	year	to	destinations	outside	Greenland	or	the	Faroe	Islands,	and	who	stays	
abroad	for	at	least	five	years.16	Individuals	who	emigrated	for	less	than	five	years	were	
removed	from	the	data,	and	the	rest	of	the	population	is	then	classified	as	non‐migrants.17	
The	analysis	of	both	migrants	and	non‐migrants	is	further	restricted	to	only	include	Danish	
citizens	who	do	not	have	an	“immigration	background.”18	
	
																																																								
15	Having	stayed	abroad	for	five	years	predicts	longer	migration	spells.	For	example	72%	of	men	and	71%	of	
women	who	left	Denmark	in	1996	and	were	still	abroad	after	five	years	were	also	abroad	after	ten	years.	
16	Greenland	and	the	Faroe	Islands	are	autonomous	regions	but	still	part	of	Denmark.	We	have	excluded	
these	destinations	as	many	of	these	migrants	could	have	originated	in	Greenland	or	the	Faroe	Islands,	and	
many	would	actually	be	returning	home	rather	than	emigrating	from	Denmark.	The	exact	duration	
requirements	were	1,825	days	or	longer	for	long‐term	migrants. 
17	We	also	examined	the	selection	of	short‐term	migrants	and	the	qualitative	results	are	similar	to	those	
reported	below,	although	the	intensity	of	selection	is	weaker.	
18	Statistics	Denmark	defines	a	person	to	have	“no	immigrant	background”	if	at	least	one	of	the	parents	was	
born	in	Denmark	and	the	person	is/was	a	Danish	citizen.	We	searched	the	population	registers	from	1980	to	
2010	for	the	parents	of	the	persons	in	our	sample,	and	if	a	parent	was	found	he	or	she	was	required	to	be	a	
Dane	with	no	immigrant	background	as	well.		
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Table	1	reports	summary	statistics	from	the	Danish	administrative	data.	The	panel	data	set	
contains	over	6.4	million	male	and	5.1	million	female	non‐migrants.	The	construction	of	the	
data	implies	that	non‐migrants	appear	in	the	data	multiple	times	(potentially	once	in	each	
cross‐section	between	1995	and	2004).	We	were	able	to	identify	7323	male	and	3436	
female	migrants.	By	construction,	these	migrants	are	persons	who	we	first	observe	residing	
in	Denmark	and	who	left	the	country	at	some	point	between	1996	and	2005.	As	Table	1	
shows,	the	Danish	emigrants	are	younger	than	the	non‐migrants,	regardless	of	gender.	
Despite	the	age	difference,	the	emigrants	earned	higher	annual	incomes	in	the	year	prior	to	
the	migration	than	the	non‐migrants.	
	
We	construct	a	simple	measure	of	“standardized	earnings”	that	adjusts	for	differences	in	
age,	gender,	and	year	effects.	Standardized	earnings	are	defined	by	the	ratio	of	a	worker’s	
annual	gross	earnings	to	the	mean	gross	earnings	of	workers	of	the	same	age	and	gender	
during	the	calendar	year.19	Table	1	shows	that	emigrants	earn	more	than	non‐migrants	in	
terms	of	standardized	earnings.	In	particular,	male	emigrants	earn	about	30	percent	more	
than	non‐migrants,	and	female	emigrants	earn	about	20	percent	more.	
	
Table	2	reports	the	number	of	emigrants	moving	to	different	destinations.	The	largest	
destinations	for	both	men	and	women	are	two	other	Nordic	countries,	Sweden	and	Norway,	
as	well	as	the	United	States,	the	United	Kingdom	and	Germany.20	These	five	countries	
account	for	57	percent	of	all	emigration.	
	
Finally,	it	is	also	interesting	to	summarize	the	link	between	education	and	emigration.	
Table	3	reports	the	education	distributions	for	non‐migrants	and	migrants.	It	is	evident	
that	the	migrants	tend	to	be	more	educated	than	the	non‐migrants,	among	both	men	and	
women.	For	example,	50	percent	of	Danish	male	non‐migrants	have	a	vocational	education,	
as	compared	to	only	30	percent	of	migrants	to	non‐Nordic	destinations.	Similarly, the 
																																																								
19	Both	migrants	and	non‐migrants,	as	well	as	shorter‐term	migrants,	are	included	in	these	calculations.	
20	If	we	relax	the	constraints	on	labor	market	status	and	age	to	enter	the	sample,	the	United	Kingdom	
emerges	as	the	largest	destination	because	of	the	large	number	of	Danish	students	who	pursue	their	
education	there. 	
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fraction of male migrants to non-Nordic destinations with a Master’s degree is 24 percent, 
whereas only 7 percent of male non-migrants have a Master’s degree. 
 
In order to add time dimension, the evolution of the emigration rate is presented in figure 1a for 
men and in figure 1b for women separately for the whole population and for those with higher 
education and without higher education. As we are looking at long-term migration, the 
emigration rates are small, but there is an upward trend. The rate is higher for men and for those 
with higher education. We also computed the difference between the average of the log 
standardized earnings, or a degree of selection, for migrants and non-migrants for each year from 
1995 to 2004 for men and women separately. The results are reported in figures 2a and 2b. There 
is a downward trend in the difference for both men and women. The finding makes sense: when 
the migrants are positively self-selected and the emigration rate gets bigger the average 
standardized earnings of migrants should get smaller. However, the variation across years is 
small, so that pooling the data is justified.  
 
To	summarize,	the	descriptive	findings	suggest	a	strong	degree	of	positive	selection—at	
least	as	measured	by	education	and	differences	in	the	conditional	means	of	earnings.	
 
4.	Selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings	
	
This	section	presents	empirical	evidence	on	the	self‐selection	of	emigrants	from	Denmark	
in	terms	of	standardized	pre‐emigration	earnings.	The	main	empirical	finding	is	that	long‐
term	emigrants	from	Denmark	were,	in	general,	much	more	productive	prior	to	their	
migration	than	individuals	who	chose	to	stay.		
	
Of	course,	the	summary	statistics	reported	in	Table	1	already	suggest	positive	selection	
among	emigrants	because	their	standardized	earnings	exceeded	those	of	non‐migrants.	
However,	differences	in	conditional	averages	could	be	masking	substantial	differences	
between	the	underlying	probability	distributions.	Our	theoretical	framework	predicts	that	
the	distribution	of	earnings	for	migrants	should	stochastically	dominate	that	of	non‐
migrants.		As	a	result,	our	empirical	analysis	will	mainly	consist	of	comparing	cumulative	
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distributions	of	standardized	earnings	between	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	An	advantage	
of	simply	graphing	and	examining	the	cumulative	distributions	is	that	the	analysis	does	not	
require	any	type	of	kernel	density	estimation,	and	that	we	do	not	need	to	impose	any	
statistical	assumptions	or	parametric	structure	on	the	data.	We	will	also	present	kernel	
density	estimates	of	the	earnings	density	functions	as	an	alternative	way	of	presenting	the	
key	insights.	Finally,	we	will	derive	and	report	statistical	tests	to	determine	if	the	data	
support	the	theoretical	prediction	of	stochastic	dominance.	
	
Figure	3a	illustrates	the	cumulative	earnings	distributions	for	male	migrants	to	Nordic	
countries,	male	migrants	to	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries,	and	for	male	non‐
migrants.	The	values	of	the	standardized	earnings	are	truncated	at	‐2	and	2	to	make	the	
graphs	more	tractable.21	The	figure	confirms	that	migrants	were	positively	selected	during	
the	study	period.	The	cumulative	distribution	function	of	standardized	earnings	of	
migrants	to	destinations	outside	the	Nordic	countries	is	clearly	located	to	the	right	of	the	
corresponding	cumulative	distribution	for	non‐migrants,	as	would	be	the	case	if	the	
cumulative	distribution	of	migrants	stochastically	dominates	that	of	non‐migrants.	The	
figure	also	shows	that	the	distribution	function	for	migrants	to	other	Nordic	countries	is	
located	to	the	right	of	that	for	non‐migrants.	However,	the	selection	of	the	migrants	to	
Nordic	countries	seems	weaker.	This	weaker	selection	may	arise	because	the	rate	of	return	
to	skills	in	Nordic	countries	is	relatively	low	when	compared	to	that	in	other	potential	
destinations.22	Figure	3b	presents	corresponding	evidence	for	women.23	The	main	findings	
are	qualitatively	similar,	but	the	positive	selection	seems	weaker.		
																																																								
21	The	truncation	does	not	alter	the	results	considerably	as	the	shares	of	observations	below	the	lower	and	
above	the	upper	truncation	points	are	small.	Further,	the	following	analysis	of	differences	between	
cumulative	distribution	functions	does	not	use	truncation.	0.07%	of	non‐migrants,	0.19%	migrants	to	other	
Nordic	countries	and	0.11%	of	migrants	to	other	destinations	lie	below	the	lower	truncation	point.	
Correspondingly,	0.03%	of	non‐migrants	and	0.21%	of	migrants	to	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries	lie	
above	the	upper	truncation	point.	There	are	no	migrants	to	other	Nordic	countries	above	the	upper	
truncation	point.	
22	Moreover,	some	Danes	may	live	in	southern	Sweden	but	work	in	Denmark.	As	this	type	of	migration	is	not	
related	to	returns	to	skills	in	the	destination	country	this	should	decrease	the	estimated	selection	to	Nordic	
countries.	
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Figure	4a	presents	the	corresponding	kernel	estimates	of	the	density	functions	of	the	
logarithm	of	standardized	earnings	for	men,	while	Figure	4b	presents	the	respective	graphs	
for	women.24	The	density	functions	again	reveal	the	positive	selection	of	migrants	moving	
outside	the	Nordic	countries,	both	for	men	and	women.		
	
As	is	evident	from	the	figures,	Kolmogorov‐Smirnov	tests	comparing	the	earnings	
distributions	for	different	groups	reject	the	hypothesis	that	the	underlying	earnings	
distributions	are	the	same	at	a	highly	significant	level.	In	addition	to	showing	that	the	
cumulative	distributions	are	different,	it	is	also	important	to	determine	if	the	evidence	
statistically	supports	the	theoretical	prediction	that	the	cumulative	distribution	function	of	
migrants	stochastically	dominates	that	of	non‐migrants.	Statistical	tests	for	first‐order	
stochastic	dominance	are	highly	sensitive	to	small	changes	in	the	underlying	distributions,	
making	it	difficult	to	rank	distributions	in	many	empirical	applications.25	As	noted	by	
Davidson	and	Duclos	(2013),	it	may	be	impossible	to	infer	stochastic	dominance	over	the	
full	support	of	empirical	distributions	if	the	distributions	are	continuous	in	the	tails,	simply	
because	there	is	not	enough	information	in	the	tails	for	meaningful	testing	of	any	statistical	
hypothesis.	It	would	then	make	sense	to	focus	on	testing	stochastic	dominance	over	a	
restricted	range	of	the	distribution.	We	apply	an	approach	that	characterizes	the	range	
over	which	the	value	of	the	cumulative	distribution	function	for	non‐migrants	is	
statistically	significantly	larger	than	that	of	non‐migrants.		
	
In	particular,	we	calculate	the	difference	between	the	cumulative	distribution	functions	
with	confidence	intervals.	To	calculate	the	confidence	intervals	we	use	tools	that	were	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
23	For	women,	0.06%	of	non‐migrants	lie	below	the	lower	truncation	point	and	0.00%	of	non‐migrants	lie	
above	the	higher	truncation	point.	There	are	no	migrants	lying	below	the	lower	or	above	the	higher	
truncation	point.		
24	Following	Leibbrandt	et	al.	(2005)	and	Fernandes‐Huertas	Moraga	(2011),	we	use	Silverman’s	reference	
bandwidth	multiplied	by	0.75	to	prevent	over‐smoothing.	The	same	bandwidth	is	used	also	in	all	the	kernel	
density	estimates	reported	in	subsequent	calculations.	
25	This	can	lead	to	difficulties	in	empirical	work,	and	less	restrictive	concepts	such	as	restricted	first	order	
stochastic	dominance	(Atkinson,	1987)	and	almost	stochastic	dominance	(Leshno	and	Kevy,	2002)	have	been	
proposed.	
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introduced	in	Araar	(2006)	and	Araar	et	al.	(2009).26	More	formally,	we	test	the	following	
null	hypothesis	for	each	ݓ ∈ ܷ,	where	ܷ	is	the	joint	support	of	the	two	distributions:	
	
(17)	 	 H0:	F(w))=	FN(w)	–	FM(w)	൏	0,		
	
against	the	alternative	hypothesis	
	
(18)	 	 H1:	F(w))=	FN(w)	–	FM(w)	൒0	
	
and	characterize	any	relevant	range	of	ݓ	where	we	are	able	to	reject	the	null.		
	
Let	ߪොሺݓሻ	be	the	standard	deviation	of	the	estimator	∆෠ሺ۴ሺwሻሻ	,	and	let	z()	be	the	(1	–	)th	
quantile	of	the	standard	normal	distribution.27	Davidson	and	Duclos	(2000)	show	that	the	
estimator	∆෠ሺ۴ሺwሻሻ	is	consistent	and	asymptotically	normally	distributed.	We	can	then	
define	the	lower	bound	for	a	one‐sided	confidence	interval	for	∆൫ࡲሺݓሻ൯	as:28	
	
(19)	 	 ܮܤ෢∆ሺ۴ሺ୵ሻሻ ൌ ∆෠ሺ۴ሺwሻሻ െ ߪොሺݓሻݖሺߠሻ.	
	
We	estimate	the	standard	errors	using	a	Taylor	linearization	and	allow	for	clustering	at	the	
individual	level.	We	then	implement	the	procedure	by	calculating	the	lower	bounds	of	the	
confidence	intervals	for	the	estimate	∆෠ሺ۴ሺwሻሻ	defined	in	equation	(19).	
	
Table	4	reports	the	shares	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants	whose	earnings	are	outside	the	
range	over	which	the	migrant	distribution	stochastically	dominates	at	a	95	percent	
confidence	level.	Consider	first	the	distributions	of	non‐migrant	men	and	men	migrating	to	
destinations	outside	the	Nordic	countries.	Although	it	is	not	clearly	visible	from	figure	3a,	
																																																								
26		The	calculations	are	implemented	using	the	DASP	Stata	module	presented	in	Araar	and	Duclos	(2013).	
27	The	asymptotic	variance	of	∆෠ሺݓሻ	is	derived	in	Araar	et	al.	(2009).	
28	Chow	(1989)	proved	the	theorem	for	the	case	of	independent	samples.	Davidson	and	Duclos	(2000)	show	
that	the	results	also	extend	to	the	case	of	paired	incomes	from	the	same	population.	
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the	cumulative	distribution	functions	cross	near	the	lower	tails	of	the	distributions.	Figure	
5a	depicts	∆෠ሺ۴ሺwሻሻ	and	lower	and	upper	bounds	for	a	95%	confidence	interval.29	The	
lower	bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	positive	on	most	of	the	range	covering	the	
supports	of	the	distributions.		Only	2.0	percent	of	the	migrants	and	3.4	percent	of	the	non‐
migrants	lie	below	the	lower	bound	of	the	range	where	the	lower	bound	of	the	confidence	
interval	is	positive,	whereas	the	shares	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants	above	the	upper	
bound	of	the	range	are	0.1	and	0.0	percent.	Put	differently,	the	earnings	of	almost	98	
percent	of	male	migrants	to	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries	are	on	the	range	where	
the	cumulative	distribution	function	for	non‐migrants	is	statistically	significantly	above	the	
function	for	migrants.			
	
Figure	5b	depicts	∆෠ሺ۴ሺwሻሻ	and	the	bounds	for	a	95%	confidence	interval	for	non‐migrant	
women	and	women	migrating	to	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries.	Only	2.8	percent	of	
the	migrants	and	4.1	percent	of	the	non‐migrants	have	earnings	below	the	range	where	the	
lower	bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	positive,	and	an	even	smaller	0.2	percent	of	the	
migrants	and	0.0	percent	of	the	non‐migrants	have	earnings	above	this	range.		We	interpret	
these	findings	as	support	for	the	stochastic	dominance	prediction	for	both	men	and	women	
migrating	outside	Nordic	countries.	
	
Figures	6a	and	6b	and	the	bottom	panel	of	Table	4	present	a	corresponding	analysis	by	
comparing	the	cumulative	distributions	of	persons	who	migrate	to	other	Nordic	countries	
with	that	of	non‐migrants.	Almost	12	percent	of	male	migrants	and	16	percent	of	male	non‐
migrants	have	earnings	that	lie	below	the	range	where	ܮܤ෢∆ሺ۴ሺ୵ሻሻ	is	positive,	and	another	1.5	
percent	of	the	migrants	and	0.7	percent	of	the	non‐migrants	have	earnings	above	the	range.	
Put	differently,	about	87	percent	of	the	male	migrants	to	Nordic	countries	have	incomes	on	
the	range	where	ܮܤ෢∆ሺ۴ሺ୵ሻሻ		is	positive.	For	women,	it	can	be	seen	in	Table	4	that	almost	95	
percent	of	the	migrants	going	to	Nordic	countries	have	earnings	on	the	range	where	
ܮܤ෢∆ሺ۴ሺ୵ሻሻ	is	positive.	To	sum	up,	the	findings	offer	support	to	the	stochastic	dominance	
																																																								
29	The	upper	bounds	are	calculated	similarly	to	the	lower	bounds.	
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prediction	for	male	and	female	migrants	regardless	of	their	destination,	although	the	
evidence	is	weaker	for	men	who	migrated	to	Nordic	countries.		
	
Additional	support	for	our	theory	comes	from	Mexico.	Our	theory	predicts	that	the	
earnings	distribution	of	migrants	from	Mexico	to	the	United	States	should	be	stochastically	
dominated	by	the	earnings	distribution	of	non‐migrants.	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	
(2011)	presents	these	distributions	for	men.	Although	he	does	not	present	confidence	
intervals	as	we	do,	the	figures	suggest	a	pattern	that	mirrors	what	we	find	for	Denmark,	
reversing	the	curves	for	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	In	Mexico,	the	wage	distribution	of	
non‐migrants	stochastically	dominates	that	of	migrants,	apart	from	an	overlap	for	a	few	
percent	at	the	bottom	and	converging	at	the	top.	
	
5.	Selection	in	unobserved	characteristics		
	
In	the	previous	section,	we	documented	the	selection	that	characterizes	the	migrants	using	
the	total	pre‐migration	earnings	(after	adjusting	for	age	and	year).	We	now	examine	a	
specific	component	of	earnings,	namely	the	component	due	to	unobserved	characteristics.	
In	particular,	we	now	adjust	for	differences	in	educational	attainment	between	migrants	
and	non‐migrants	(as	well	as	other	observable	variables)	by	running	earnings	regressions,	
and	determine	whether	the	distribution	of	the	residuals	differs	between	the	two	groups.30	
	
By	construction,	the	residuals	from	a	Mincerian	wage	regression	reflect	the	part	of	earnings	
that	is	uncorrelated	with	the	observed	measures	of	skill.	Obviously,	the	decomposition	is	
somewhat	arbitrary	because	it	depends	on	the	characteristics	that	are	observed	and	can	be	
included	as	regressors	in	the	wage	equation.	Nevertheless,	the	study	of	emigrant	selection	
in	terms	of	wage	residuals	is	important	for	a	number	of	reasons.	
	
																																																								
30	In	the	earnings	regressions	we	use	non‐standardized	annual	earnings	as	the	dependent	variable.	We	
include	age	and	year	fixed	effects	and	run	the	regressions	separately	for	men	and	women.	
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First,	selection	in	terms	of	unobservable	characteristics	sheds	light	on	the	importance	of	
the	quality	of	job	matches	relative	to	the	skill	component	that	is	internationally	
transferable.	The	theory	predicts	that	the	nature	of	the	selection	in	unobservable	
characteristics	depends	on	the	magnitude	of	the	correlation	coefficient	measuring	how	the	
source	and	destination	countries	value	these	types	of	skills.	As	long	as	this	correlation	is	
strongly	positive	(so	that	unobserved	characteristics	are	easily	transferable	across	
countries),	Danish	emigrants	would	be	positively	selected	in	unobservables.	After	all,	the	
payoff	to	these	types	of	skills	is	likely	to	be	greater	in	the	destination	countries.	However,	it	
could	be	argued	that	the	correlation	between	the	wage	residuals	in	Denmark	and	abroad	
may	be	“small”.	For	example,	the	residuals	from	the	wage	regression	may	be	largely	
reflecting	the	quality	of	the	existing	job	match	in	the	Danish	labor	market,	rather	than	
measuring	the	worker’s	innate	productivity.	To	the	extent	that	the	quality	of	the	job	match	
plays	an	important	role	in	generating	the	residual,	the	correlation	in	this	residual	across	
countries	would	be	expected	to	be	weak	(in	fact,	a	pure	random	matching	model	would	
suggest	that	it	would	be	zero).	As	a	result,	there	would	be	negative	selection	in	unobserved	
characteristics	simply	because	Danish	workers	with	good	job	matches	(and	hence	high	
values	of	the	residual)	would	not	move.	
	
Second,	the	theory	also	suggests	that	the	nature	of	the	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings	
depends	on	a	weighted	average	of	the	selection	that	occurs	in	observable	and	unobservable	
characteristics,	with	the	weights	being	the	fraction	of	earnings	variance	attributable	to	
each	type	of	skill.	Because	observable	characteristics	play	only	a	limited	role	in	explaining	
the	variance	of	earnings	in	the	population,	it	is	crucial	to	precisely	delineate	the	nature	of	
selection	in	unobservable	characteristics.	
		
Table	5	reports	the	Mincerian	wage	regressions	that	we	use	to	calculate	the	residuals.	The	
sample	includes	the	whole	population	of	prime	aged	full	time	workers	pooled	over	the	
entire	1995‐2004	period.	In	addition	to	vectors	of	fixed	effects	giving	the	worker’s	age	and	
educational	attainment,	we	also	include	the	worker’s	marital	status	and	number	of	children.	
The	regressions	are	estimated	separately	for	men	and	women.		
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Figure	7a	presents	the	cumulative	distributions	of	wage	residuals	for	male	migrants	to	
Nordic	countries,	male	migrants	to	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries,	and	male	non‐
migrants.	The	values	of	the	residuals	are	truncated	at	‐2	and	2,	a	range	that	covers	
practically	all	of	the	population.31	The	cumulative	distribution	function	of	residuals	for	
emigrants	who	moved	outside	the	Nordic	countries	is	located	to	the	right	of	the	cumulative	
distribution	for	migrants	to	Nordic	countries,	which	in	turn	is	located	to	the	right	of	the	
cumulative	distribution	of	the	non‐migrants.	The	visual	evidence,	therefore,	provides	a	
strong	indication	that	migrants	are	positively	selected	in	terms	of	unobserved	
characteristics.	Figure	7b	presents	the	analogous	evidence	for	women.32	The	figure	shows	
that	female	migrants	are	also	positively	selected	in	terms	of	wage	residuals.	As	was	the	
case	when	comparing	the	measure	of	pre‐migration	earnings	in	the	previous	section,	the	
selection	in	unobserved	characteristics	is	less	pronounced	for	women	than	for	men.	One	
explanation	for	this	could	be	that	men	are	typically	primary	earners	in	couples.		
		
We	also	performed	Kolmogorov‐Smirnov	tests	on	the	distributions	of	residuals	for	non‐
migrants	and	migrants	to	other	Nordic	countries	and	for	migrants	to	other	destinations	
(separately	for	men	and	women).	All	the	tests	clearly	rejected	the	null	hypothesis,	
confirming	that	the	distributions	of	residuals	indeed	differ	among	the	groups.33	
	
The	evidence	on	the	positive	selection	of	migrants	in	unobserved	characteristics	obviously	
implies	that	the	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings	documented	in	the	previous	section	
cannot	be	attributed	solely	to	the	fact	that	migrants	are	more	educated.	Instead,	we	find	
that	there	is	positive	selection	within	education	groups.	This	result	also	has	implications	on	
																																																								
31	For	men,	0.05%	of	non‐migrants,	0.19%	of	migrants	to	other	Nordic	countries	and	0.11%	of	migrants	to	
other	destinations	lie	below	the	lower	truncation	point.	Correspondingly,	0.03%	of	non‐migrants	and	0.23%	
of	migrants	to	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries	lie	above	the	upper	truncation	point.	There	are	no	
migrants	to	other	Nordic	countries	above	the	upper	truncation	point.	
32	For	women,	0.05%	of	non‐migrants	lie	below	the	lower	truncation	point	and	0.00%	of	non‐migrants	lie	
above	the	higher	truncation	point.	There	are	no	migrants	lying	below	the	lower	or	above	the	higher	
truncation	point.	
33	The	p‐value	for	the	test	between	women	migrating	to	other	Nordic	countries	and	to	other	destinations	was	
0.015	and	all	the	other	p‐values	were	0.000,	so	that	all	tests	clearly	reject	the	hypothesis	that	the	
observations	are	drawn	from	the	same	distribution.	
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the	interpretation	of	earnings	regression	residuals	in	general.	The	residuals	from	wage	
regressions	are	sometimes	interpreted	as	reflecting	the	value	of	the	job	match	between	the	
worker	and	the	employer.	If	a	high	value	for	the	residual	only	reflects	a	good	match,	we	
would	then	expect	to	find	that	workers	with	large	residuals	would	be	less	likely	to	change	
jobs	and	less	prone	to	migrate.	Our	findings	clearly	reject	this	interpretation.		Comparing	
results	on	the	self‐selection	to	other	Nordic	countries	and	the	rest	of	the	world	suggests	
that	search	for	a	better	job	match	to	those	who	have	a	bad	job	match	in	Denmark	is	more	
pronounced	among	migrants	to	other	Nordic	countries.34	
	
As	in	the	previous	section,	we	also	calculated	the	difference	between	the	cumulative	
distribution	functions	with	confidence	intervals	to	determine	whether	empirical	evidence	
supports	the	stochastic	dominance	prediction.	The	test	results	are	summarized	in	Table	6.	
Figure	8a	depicts	∆෠ሺ۴ሺwሻሻ	and	the	lower	and	upper	bounds	for	a	95%	confidence	interval	
for	the	comparison	between	non‐migrant	men	and	men	migrating	to	destinations	outside	
Nordic	countries.	The	lower	bound	of	the	95%	confidence	interval	is	positive	on	the	range	
of	residuals	covering	most	of	the	support	of	the	two	distributions.	9.9	percent	of	the	
migrants	and	15.2	percent	of	the	non‐migrants	have	wage	residuals	below	the	lower	bound	
of	this	range,	whereas	the	shares	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants	above	the	upper	bound	of	
the	range	are	0.1	and	0.0	percent.35		
	
Figure	9a	depicts	∆෠ሺ۴ሺwሻሻ	and	the	bounds	for	a	95%	confidence	interval	for	non‐migrant	
men	and	men	migrating	to	other	Nordic	countries.	A	13	percent	share	of	migrants	and	15	
percent	of	non‐migrants	have	values	of	the	wage	residual	that	are	below	the	lower	bound	
of	the	range	where	the	lower	bound	of	the	95%	confidence	interval	is	positive,	and		shares	
of	2	percent	and	1	percent	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants	have	values	of	the	residual	that	
																																																								
34	For	this	group,	returns	to	unobserved	productivity	are	not	as	important	a	criterion	for	self‐selection	as	
among	migrants	to	the	rest	of	the	world,	simply	because	differences	in	returns	to	skills	between	Denmark	and	
other	Nordic	countries	are	minor.	As	a	result,	the	mechanism	of	searching	for	a	better	match	quality	is	more	
pronounced.	
35	For	women,	20	percent	of	migrants	and	25	percent	of	non‐migrants	have	earnings	residuals	below	the	
lower	bound	of	the	range	where	the	lower	bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	positive,	and	shares	of	migrants	
and	non‐migrants	above	the	range	are	less	than	one	percent.	
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would	place	them	above	this	range.	Put	differently,	the	residuals	of	over	84	percent	of	male	
migrants	to	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries	are	on	the	range	where	the	cumulative	
distribution	function	for	non‐migrants	is	statistically	significantly	above	the	function	for	
migrants.36	Interestingly,	there	is	a	sizable	area	in	the	left	tail	of	the	distribution	of	
residuals	where	the	upper	bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	negative.37		
	
We	conclude	by	summarizing	the	evidence	as	follows:	there	is	strong	positive	selection	in	
unobservable	characteristics	in	the	sample	of	migrants	that	moved	outside	the	Nordic	
countries	and	weaker	evidence	of	positive	selection	in	the	sample	of	migrants	who	moved	
to	other	Nordic	countries.	
	
6.	Bias	in	counterfactual	predictions	
	
The	fact	that	emigrants	are	self‐selected	in	their	unobserved	characteristics	implies	that	
using	the	observable	characteristics	of	migrants	to	predict	their	counterfactual	earnings	
had	they	chosen	not	to	migrate	will	lead	to	biased	results.	Due	to	data	constraints,	this	is	
precisely	the	empirical	exercise	conducted	by	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005),	who	adopt	the	
methodology	introduced	by	DiNardo,	Fortin,	and	Lemieux	(1996)	and	build	a	
counterfactual	wage	density	of	what	the	Mexican	immigrants	would	have	earned	in	Mexico	
had	they	stayed.	The	actual	wage	density	of	Mexican	“stayers”	is	then	compared	to	the	
counterfactual	density	for	migrants.	By	construction,	this	approach	ignores	the	role	of	
unobservable	characteristics	in	the	estimation	of	the	counterfactual	wage	distribution.	
	
A	clear	advantage	of	the	Danish	administrative	data	is	that	the	earnings	of	emigrants	can	be	
observed	before	they	emigrate,	so	there	is	no	need	to	build	a	counterfactual	density.	One	
just	needs	to	compare	the	earnings	distribution	of	non‐migrants	to	the	actual	distribution	
																																																								
36	For	women,	20	percent	of	migrants	and	25	percent	of	non‐migrants	have	earnings	residuals	below	the	
lower	bound	of	the	range	where	the	lower	bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	positive,	and	shares	of	migrants	
and	non‐migrants	above	the	range	are	3	percent	and	2	percent.	
37	A	2	percent	share	of	migrants	and	2	percent	share	of	non‐migrants	have	residuals	in	this	area,	and	the	
interpretation	would	be	that	male	migrants	to	other	Nordic	countries	are	negatively	selected	in	terms	of	
residuals	in	the	left	tail	of	the	distribution.	
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of	future	migrants,	as	we	have	done	in	the	preceding	analysis.	The	administrative	data,	
however,	allows	us	to	precisely	measure	the	extent	of	the	bias	resulting	from	carrying	out	
the	counterfactual	exercise	in	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005).	In	particular,	we	can	contrast	
the	predicted	counterfactual	wage	distribution	of	migrants	had	they	not	moved	to	the	
actual	wage	distribution	of	migrants	prior	to	their	move.	We	carry	out	this	exercise	by	
precisely	replicating	the	various	steps	in	the	Chiquiar‐Hanson	calculations.	It	is	worth	
emphasizing	that	this	type	of	bias	will	arise	not	only	in	studies	that	examine	the	selection	of	
migrants,	but	in	any	study	that	relies	on	observables	to	predict	a	counterfactual	wage	
distribution.		
	
Let	ݓ	represent	the	logarithm	of	standardized	annual	earnings	as	defined	earlier	(i.e.	
earnings	adjusted	for	age,	gender,	and	year	effects).	Let	݂ሺݓ|ݔሻ	be	the	density	function	of	
wages	in	Denmark,	conditional	on	a	set	of	observable	characteristics	ݔ.	Also,	let	ܫ	be	an	
indicator	variable	equal	to	one	if	the	individual	migrates	the	following	year	and	equal	to	
zero	otherwise.	Define	further	݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 0ሻ	as	the	conditional	density	of	observed	
characteristics	among	workers	in	Denmark	who	choose	not	to	migrate,	and	݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ	be	
the	corresponding	conditional	density	among	migrants.	The	observed	wage	density	for	the	
non‐migrants	is	
	
(20)	 	 ݃ሺݓ|ܫ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ ׬݂ሺݓ|ݔ, ܫ ൌ 0ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 0ሻ ݀ݔ.	
	
Similarly,	the	observed	density	for	the	migrants	is	
	
(21)	 	 ݃ሺݓ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ׬݂ሺݓ|ݔ, ܫ ൌ 1ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ݀ݔ.	
	
Up	to	this	point,	the	analysis	reported	in	this	paper	consists	of	directly	estimating	and	
comparing	the	distribution	functions	associated	with	the	densities	in	equations	(20)	and	
(21).	Suppose	that	the	pre‐migration	earnings	density	for	non‐migrants	were	not	available.	
We	would	instead	attempt	to	estimate	it	from	the	observable	characteristics	of	the	
migrants.	The	implied	counterfactual	distribution	is:	
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(23)	 	 ො݃ሺݓ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ׬݂ሺݓ|ݔ, ܫ ൌ 0ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ݀ݔ.	
	
Equation	(23)	corresponds	to	the	density	of	income	for	non‐migrants,	but	it	is	instead	
integrated	over	the	density	of	observable	characteristics	for	migrants.	Note	that	the	
counterfactual	density	in	(23)	can	be	rewritten	as:	
	
(24)	 	 	
ො݃ሺݓ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ න݂ሺݓ|ݔ, ܫ ൌ 0ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 0ሻ ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 0ሻ ݀ݔ	
	 	 	 	 	
		 	 	 ൌ ׬ ߠ݂ሺݓ|ݔ, ܫ ൌ 0ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 0ሻ ݀ݔ,	
	 	
where		ൌ ௛ሺ௫|ூୀଵሻ௛ሺ௫|ூୀ଴ሻ	.	To	compute	ߠ,	we	use	Bayes’	law	to	write:	
	
(25)	 	 ݄ሺݔሻ ൌ ௛ሺ௫|ூୀ଴ሻ௉௥ሺூୀ଴ሻ୔୰	ሺூୀ଴|௫ሻ 		and		݄ሺݔሻ ൌ
௛ሺ௫|ூୀଵሻ௉௥ሺூୀଵሻ
୔୰	ሺூୀଵ|௫ሻ ,	
	
where	݄ሺݔሻ	is	the	unconditional	density	of	observed	characteristics.		
	
We	can	then	combine	these	two	equations	to	solve	for	:	
	
(26)	 	 	
ߠ ൌ ܲݎሺܫ ൌ 1|ݔሻ1 െ ܲݎሺܫ ൌ 1|ݔሻ	
ܲݎሺܫ ൌ 0ሻ
ܲݎሺܫ ൌ 1ሻ.	
	
The	proportion	Pr(I	=	0)/Pr(I	=	1)	is	a	constant	related	to	the	proportion	of	migrants	in	the	
data.	It	can	be	set	to	one	in	kernel	density	estimation	without	loss	of	generality.	The	weight	
we	use	in	the	estimation	is	then	given	by:	
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(27)	 	 	
ߠ௘ ൌ ܲݎሺܫ ൌ 1|ݔሻ1 െ ܲݎሺܫ ൌ 1|ݔሻ .	
	
As	in	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005),	the	individual	weights	e	are	calculated	by	estimating	a	
logit	model	where	the	dependent	variable	indicates	if	a	person	emigrated.	The	regressors	
include	a	vector	of	age	fixed	effects,	a	vector	of	schooling	fixed	effects,	variables	indicating	
whether	the	worker	is	married	and	the	number	of	children	(and	an	interaction	between	
these	two	variables),	and	a	vector	of	year	fixed	effects.38	Table	7	reports	the	logit	
regressions	estimated	separately	by	gender.	The	coefficients	are	then	used	to	compute	the	
weights	for	each	non‐migrant	person	in	the	sample.39	Figures	10a	and	10b	present	the	
resulting	counterfactual	density	functions	of	the	logarithm	of	standardized	earnings	as	well	
as	the	actual	distributions	for	migrants	and	non‐migrants.40	
	
The	difference	between	the	actual	density	for	non‐migrants	and	the	counterfactual	density	
for	migrants	reflects	the	part	of	self‐selection	that	is	due	to	observable	characteristics.	
Similarly,	the	difference	between	the	counterfactual	and	actual	densities	for	migrants	
reflects	the	part	of	selection	that	is	due	to	unobserved	characteristics	(i.e.,	all	those	
variables	that	could	not	be	included	in	the	logit	model).	
	
One	simple	way	of	quantifying	these	distributional	differences	is	to	compute	the	averages	
of	the	various	distributions.	These	calculations	are	reported	in	Table	8.	Consider	initially	
the	results	in	the	male	sample.	The	difference	between	the	mean	of	the	actual	distributions	
for	migrants	and	non‐migrants	is	0.245	log	points,	but	the	difference	between	the	
counterfactual	distribution	and	the	distribution	for	non‐migrants	is	0.073.	This	implies	that	
only	about	30	percent	of	the	positive	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings	can	be	attributed	
																																																								
38	We	also	tried	specifications	with	age,	age	squared	and	interactions	of	explanatory	variables,	but	we	do	not	
report	these	analyses	as	the	resulting	counterfactual	distributions	did	not	practically	differ	from	the	
distributions	resulting	from	this	simpler	specification.		
39	As	earlier,	we	use	Silverman’s	reference	bandwidth	multiplied	by	0.75.	
40	To	conduct	the	counterfactual	analysis	we	pool	the	sample	of	all	migrants	(regardless	of	whether	they	
moved	to	Nordic	countries	or	not).	
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to	the	observable	characteristics	included	in	the	logit	model,	while	about	70	percent	is	
attributable	to	unobservable	determinants	of	productivity.	
	
The	calculations	in	the	female	sample	yield	a	difference	of	0.157	log	points	between	the	
means	of	the	actual	distributions	for	migrants	and	non‐migrants	and	a	difference	of	0.074	
points	between	the	counterfactual	distribution	and	the	distribution	for	non‐migrants.	As	a	
result,	observable	and	unobservable	characteristics	each	account	for	about	half	of	the	
positive	self‐selection	in	the	pre‐migration	earnings	of	women.41	The	key	lesson	is	clear:	
selection	in	unobservable	characteristics	plays	a	crucial	role	in	determining	the	skill	
composition	of	emigrants.	
	
The	distinct	role	of	observables	and	unobservables	in	determining	the	selection	in	the	pre‐
migration	earnings	of	migrants	is	evident	if	we	return	to	the	Roy	model	and	equation	(16),	
which	presents	the	conditional	expectation	E(log	w0	|	v*	>	*).		
	
Equation	(16)	yields	an	interesting	and	potentially	important	insight.	The	nature	of	the	
selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings,	of	course,	is	given	by	the	sum	of	the	selection	in	
observables	and	the	selection	in	unobservables.	Note,	however,	that	each	of	these	selection	
terms	has	a	weighting	coefficient	that	represents	the	variance	in	earnings	attributable	to	
observable	characteristics	( r02S2)	or	to	unobservable	characteristics	(02 ).	As	noted	earlier,	
observable	characteristics	explain	a	relatively	small	fraction	of	the	variance	in	earnings.	Put	
differently,	equation	(16)	implies	that	it	is	the	selection	in	unobservables	that	is	most	likely	
to	determine	the	nature	of	the	selection	that	characterizes	the	emigrant	sample.	
	
To	the	extent	that	both	types	of	selections	(i.e.,	in	observables	and	unobservables)	work	in	
the	same	direction,	the	counterfactual	exercise	described	in	this	section	will	inevitably	
underestimate	the	true	extent	of	positive	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings.	Conversely,	
																																																								
41	The	component	of	self‐selection	that	is	due	to	unobservable	characteristics	plays	a	somewhat	smaller	role	
for	women.	One	reason	could	be	that	women	are	more	often	tied	migrants,	and	the	migration	decision	may	be	
mainly	based	on	the	skills	of	the	spouse.	The	variance	in	income	is	also	smaller	for	women,	which	also	makes	
the	selection	both	in	terms	of	observable	and	unobservable	characteristics	weaker.		
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the	counterfactual	exercise	will	also	attenuate	the	extent	of	“true”	negative	selection	if	
there	is	negative	selection	in	both	components	of	skills.	In	fact,	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	
(2011)	presents	a	corresponding	analysis	using	survey	data	from	Mexico	and	finds	that	
counterfactual	estimates	greatly	underestimate	the	extent	of	negative	selection	in	the	pre‐
migration	earnings	of	Mexicans	who	move	to	the	United	States.	Put	differently,	the	
counterfactual	exercise	may	lead	to	qualitatively	right	conclusions	about	the	nature	of	the	
selection,	but	it	may	also	generate	a	sizable	bias,	greatly	underestimating	the	true	extent	of	
either	positive	or	negative	selection.		
	
7.	Selection	and	immigration	restrictions	
	
As	applied	in	the	immigration	literature,	the	Roy	model	focuses	solely	on	the	economic	
factors	that	motivate	labor	flows	across	international	borders.	The	modeling	typically	
ignores	the	fact	that	these	flows	occur	within	a	policy	framework	where	some	receiving	
countries	enact	detailed	restrictions	specifying	which	potential	migrants	are	admissible	
and	which	are	not.	
	
We	can	use	the	administrative	data	from	Denmark,	combined	with	the	unique	political	
circumstances	that	guarantee	free	migration	within	Europe,	to	partially	address	the	
question	of	whether	immigration	policy	affects	selection	all	that	much	in	the	end.	
Specifically,	we	can	subdivide	the	group	of	migrants	who	moved	outside	Nordic	countries	
into	two	groups:	those	who	moved	to	a	country	in	the	EU15	or	to	Switzerland,	and	those	
who	moved	to	a	country	outside	the	EU15	and	Switzerland.	Movement	of	labor	was	
unrestricted	between	Denmark	and	other	EU15	countries	and	Switzerland	in	the	period	
under	study,	but	was	obviously	restricted	by	immigration	regulations	to	destinations	
outside	the	EU15,	such	as	the	United	States.		
	
It	turns	out	that	these	different	immigration	policies	pursued	by	the	EU15	and	Switzerland	
and	the	rest	of	the	world	barely	matter	in	determining	the	selection	of	Danish	emigrants.	
Figure	11a	depicts	the	cumulative	distribution	functions	of	the	logarithm	of	standardized	
annual	income	for	men	and	figure	11b	for	women.	It	is	evident	that	the	distribution	
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functions	of	standardized	earnings	are	very	similar	for	the	two	groups	of	migrants.42	We	
also	conducted	the	analysis	using	the	wage	residuals	(not	shown),	and	the	distributions	of	
residuals	are	also	similar	between	the	two	groups.	
	
There	is	an	important	sense	in	which	these	policy	restrictions	cannot	matter	much.	
Suppose,	for	example,	that	a	receiving	country	enacts	a	policy	that	limits	entry	only	to	high‐
skill	immigrants.	If	the	high‐skill	immigrants	from	a	sending	country	do	not	find	it	optimal	
to	move,	the	policy	cannot	force	those	high‐skill	workers	to	migrate.	All	the	policy	can	do	is	
essentially	cut	the	migration	flow	from	that	particular	sending	country	down	to	zero.	The	
low‐skill	workers	would	like	to	move	but	are	not	admitted,	and	the	high	skill	workers	are	
admissible	but	they	do	not	want	to	move.	
	
In	sum,	the	positive	self‐selection	that	is	so	evident	in	the	Danish	emigrant	data	cannot	be	
explained	by	immigration	restrictions.	Even	though	labor	flows	to	the	EU15	and	
Switzerland	were	unrestricted,	there	is	no	evidence	of	weaker	positive	selection	to	these	
countries	than	to	the	rest	of	the	world.	Our results also have tentative implications for the 
question of whether migration patterns reflect differences in rate of returns or migration costs. 
Although it is plausible that migration costs are higher when moving to other continents, our 
results suggest that such differences do not play a significant role in the sorting of emigrants 
between Europe and other continents, most notably North America.	
  
8.	Conclusion	
 
This	paper	shows	that	the	Roy	model	has	more	dramatic	predictions	on	the	self‐selection	of	
emigrants	than	previously	examined.	The	same	conditions	that	have	been	shown	to	result	
in	emigrants	being	positively	(negatively)	self‐selected	in	terms	of	their	average	earnings	
actually	imply	that	the	earnings	distribution	of	emigrants	first‐order	stochastically	
dominates	(or	is	first‐order	stochastically	dominated	by)	the	earnings	distribution	of	non‐
																																																								
42	For	women,	a	Kolmogorov‐Smirnov	test	is	not	able	to	reject	the	null‐hypothesis	that	the	observations	for	
the	two	groups	of	migrants	come	from	the	same	underlying	distribution.		
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migrants.		Our	theoretical	analysis	also	distinguishes	between	selection	in	observable	and	
selection	in	unobservable	characteristics.	
	
Our	empirical	analysis	uses	the	Danish	full	population	administrative	data	to	analyze	the	
self‐selection	of	emigrants,	in	terms	of	education,	earnings	and	unobservable	ability,	
measured	by	residuals	from	Mincerian	earnings	regressions.	The	results	are	in	line	with	
the	theory;	the	migrants	are	better	educated	and	both	pre‐emigration	earnings	and	wage	
regression	residuals	of	migrants	stochastically	dominate	those	of	non‐migrants	over	most	
of	the	support	of	the	distributions.	Consider,	for	example,	the	case	of	full‐time	workers	
aged	25‐54.	For	98	percent	of	men	and	97	percent	of	women	who	migrate	outside	other	
Nordic	countries	the	cumulative	earnings	distribution	in	the	year	before	emigration	
stochastically	dominates	that	of	non‐migrants	with	a	95%	confidence	interval.	The	
difference	between	the	cumulative	distributions	is	not	statistically	significantly	different	in	
either	direction	for	the	remaining	2	to	3	percent.	
	
Decomposing	the	self‐selection	in	total	earnings	into	self‐selection	in	observable	
characteristics	and	self‐selection	in	unobservable	characteristics	(as	measured	by	residuals	
from	Mincerian	wage	regressions),	reveals	that	unobserved	abilities	play	the	dominant	role.	
For	men,	about	70	percent	of	the	positive	self‐selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings	is	
attributable	to	unobservable	determinants	of	productivity.	For	women,	the	fraction	is	
about	50	percent.	This	suggests	that	relying	on	counterfactual	distributions,	based	on	
observed	characteristics,	would	strongly	underestimate	positive	self‐selection.	This	result	
complements	the	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	(2011)	finding	that	counterfactual	estimates	
also	greatly	underestimate	the	extent	of	negative	selection	in	the	pre‐migration	earnings	of	
Mexicans	who	move	to	the	United	States.	In	short,	the	use	of	counterfactual	earnings	
distributions	based	on	observable	characteristics	greatly	understate	the	true	extent	of	
selection	in	total	earnings.	Strong	positive	self‐selection	in	residuals	also	suggests	that	
unobserved	abilities	play	a	much	bigger	role	in	migration	decisions	than	match	quality.	
	
Our	findings	also	have	implications	for	immigration	policies.	Receiving	countries	can	only	
base	their	admission	policies	on	skill	variables	that	are	observed,	whereas	much	of	the	
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selection	of	immigrants	is	“hidden”	in	their	unobserved	characteristics.	It	can	be	expected	
that	migrants	will	be	self‐selected	in	terms	of	unobserved	characteristics	even	when	
admission	restrictions	are	applied,	and	the	self‐selection	among	those	fulfilling	admission	
criteria	can	be	expected	to	reflect	relative	skill	prices.	This	raises	a	question	about	the	
effectiveness	of	point	systems	that	are	necessarily	based	on	observable	characteristics.	The	
importance	of	relative	skill	prices	is	also	supported	by	our	separate	analyses	of	self‐
selection	of	Danes	migrating	to	the	countries	belonging	to	common	European	labor	market	
(excluding	other	Nordic	countries	that	have	skill	prices	similar	to	Denmark)	and	not	having	
any	immigration	restrictions,	and	the	self‐selection	to	the	rest	of	the	world.	There	is	
virtually	no	difference	in	the	self‐selection	to	these	destination	areas.		
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Table	1.	Summary	statistics	
	
	
 Non-migrant men 
Migrant 
men 
Non-migrant 
women 
Migrant 
women 
Observations 6450665 7323 5163129 3436 
Age     
Average 39.8 33.0 40.2 35 
Median 40.0 35.4 40.0 33.0 
Annual earnings in 
2010 euros     
Average 52725 68151 40299 46412 
Median 46675 57350 37976 42393 
Standardized annual 
earnings      
Average 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.2 
Median 0.9 1.2 0.95 1.1 
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Table	2.	Numbers	of	migrants,	by	destination	
	
 Men Women 
Sweden 1466 699
The United States                 763 363 
The United Kingdom  725 432 
Norway 576 273 
Germany 560 249 
Spain 255 147 
Switzerland 233 118 
France 222 156 
Other 2523 999 
	
	
	
	 	
 51
	
Table	3.	Education	levels	of	non‐migrants	and	migrants	going	to	Nordic	countries	or	
to	other	destinations	
	
 Men Women 
Education Non-migrants 
Nordic 
countries 
Other 
destinations 
Non-
migrants 
Nordic 
countries 
Other 
destinations 
Comprehensive 
school 21.4 19.8 8.3 21.5 15.7 8.9 
High school 3.2 7.8 8.6 3.1 6.9 8.9 
Vocational 
school 49.8 43.5 30.3 41.8 36.5 30.8 
Advanced 
vocational  5.6 5.7 6.6 4.9 5.1 7.8 
Bachelor or 
equivalent 12.2 11.6 20.6 23.3 22.9 25.4 
Master’s or 
equivalent 7.3 10.6 23.9 5.1 12.3 17.6 
Doctoral or 
equivalent 0.5 1.0 1.7 0.2 0.7 0.7 
	
Notes: The unit is percentage. The category “advanced vocational” includes all the tertiary education programs 
below the level of a Bachelor’s program or equivalent. Programs on this level may be referred to for instance with 
such terms as community college education, advanced vocational training or associate degree. 
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Table	4.	Summary	of	tests	of	stochastic	dominance	in	distributions	of	standardized	
pre‐migration	earnings	
	 	
	
	 	
Distributions being 
compared: 
Percent of sample below 
lower bound	
Percent of sample above upper 
bound	
 Migrants	 Non-migrants	 Migrants	 Non-migrants	
Migrants outside Nordic 
countries  and non-
migrants 
    
Male 2.0 	 3.4 	 0.1 	 0.0 	
Female 2.8 	 4.1 	 0.2 	 0.0 	
Migrants to Nordic 
countries and non-
migrants 
	 	 	 	
Male 11.6 	 15.5 	 1.5 	 0.7 	
Female 2.6 	 4.1 	 2.6 	 1.3 	
	
Notes:	Lower	bound	and	upper	bound	refer	to	the	range	over	which	the	difference	of	the	cumulative	
distribution	functions	is	significant	at	a	95	percent	confidence	level.		
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Table	5.	Mincerian	earnings	regressions,	by	gender	
 
 (1) men (2) women 
 B Se B se 
Married 0.068*** (0.00) -0.016*** (0.00) 
Children 0.025*** (0.00) -0.048*** (0.00) 
High school 0.224*** (0.00) 0.190*** (0.00) 
Vocational school  0.092*** (0.00) 0.089*** (0.00) 
Advanced vocational  0.186*** (0.00) 0.198*** (0.00) 
Bachelor   0.298*** (0.00) 0.225*** (0.00) 
Master’s  0.498*** (0.00) 0.536*** (0.00) 
PhD 0.490*** (0.00) 0.622*** (0.00) 
1996 0.020*** (0.00) 0.017*** (0.00) 
1997 0.043*** (0.00) 0.041*** (0.00) 
1998 0.078*** (0.00) 0.083*** (0.00) 
1999 0.103*** (0.00) 0.112*** (0.00) 
2000 0.141*** (0.00) 0.143*** (0.00) 
2001 0.175*** (0.00) 0.175*** (0.00) 
2002 0.207*** (0.00) 0.210*** (0.00) 
2003 0.236*** (0.00) 0.235*** (0.00) 
2004 0.252*** (0.00) 0.258*** (0.00) 
Constant 
Age fixed effects 
12.131*** 
Yes 
(0.00) 
 
11.931*** 
Yes 
(0.00) 
 
N 
R-squared 
6470720 
0.2597  
5173706 
0.3062  
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The table reports OLS results for the log annual earnings. Individually clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
Coefficients for the age dummies are not shown.
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Table	6.	Summary	of	tests	of	stochastic	dominance	in	distributions	of	residuals	
	
	
Distributions being 
compared: 
Percent of sample 
below lower bound 
Percent of sample above upper bound
 Migrants Non-
migrants 
Migrants Non-migrants 
Migrants outside Nordic 
countries and non-migrants 
    
Male 9.9  15.2  0.1  0.0  
Female 19.6  24.7  0.4  0.0  
Migrants to Nordic countries 
and non-migrants 
    
Male 13.4  15.2  2.0  0.9  
Female 19.5  24.7  3.4  1.8  
	
Notes:	Lower	bound	and	upper	bound	refer	to	the	range	over	which	the	difference	of	the	cumulative	
distribution	functions	is	significant	at	a	95	percent	confidence	level.		
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Table	7.	Logit	estimates	of	the	probability	of	emigration,	by	gender	
	
 (1) men (2) women 
 B Se B se 
Married -0.110**   (0.04)  -0.191*** (0.05)  
Children -1.137*** (0.05)  -1.232*** (0.07)  
 Married*Children 0.460*** (0.07)  0.374*** (0.09)  
 High school 1.377*** (0.05)  1.158*** (0.08)  
 Vocational school 0.186*** (0.04)  0.159** (0.06)  
 Advanced vocational 0.648*** (0.06)  0.714*** (0.08)  
Bachelor 1.097*** (0.04)  0.581***        (0.06) 
Master’s 1.652*** (0.04)  1.444***        (0.07) 
PhD 1.723*** (0.10)  1.655***        (0.21) 
y1996 -0.032  (0.06)  -0.001  (0.08)  
y1997 0.002  (0.06)  -0.016  (0.08)  
y1998 -0.024  (0.06)  -0.001  (0.08)  
y1999 0.230*** (0.05)  0.131  (0.08)  
y2000 0.260*** (0.06)  0.238** (0.09)  
y2001 0.161** (0.05)  0.146  (0.08)  
y2002 0.208*** (0.05) 0.046 (0.08) 
y2003 0.198*** (0.05) 0.112 (0.08) 
y2004 0.246*** (0.05) 0.178* (0.08) 
Constant -6.700*** (0.08)  -6.951*** (0.12)  
N 6470720   5173706  
Pseudo ܴଶ 0.0540  0.0557  
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Notes: The table reports logit results for the long-term emigration. Individually clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. Coefficients for the age fixed effects are not shown.
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Table	8.	Actual	and	counterfactual	differences	between	the	average	log	standardized	
earnings	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants	
 Men Women 
Non-migrant average -0.065 -0.040
Estimated average for migrants 0.008 0.034 
True average for migrants 0.180 0.117 
True difference 0.245 0.157 
Counterfactual difference 0.073 0.074 
Share of the actual difference explained 
by observable characteristics, % 
29.6 
 
47.0 
 
	
